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INTRODUCTION 
he 2019 Kentucky Derby was the 145th running1 of the most 
venerable event in the “sport of kings,”2 and horse racing 
observers and sports enthusiasts will likely discuss its controversial 
outcome for years to come.3 Initially, the winner of the May 4, 2019, 
race appeared to be Maximum Security—a horse at nine-to-two odds.4 
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The author would like to thank the staff of the Oregon Law Review for the exceptional 
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1 Joe Drape, Country House Wins Kentucky Derby After Maximum Security Is 
Disqualified, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/sports/ 
kentucky-derby-live.html [https://perma.cc/674R-QWQY]. 
2 Michael Kilian, The Evolution of the Sport of Kings, CHI. TRIB. (May 4, 1988), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1988-05-04-8803140377-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/R62G-SJJ2] (“In the beginning, horse racing actually was the sport of 
kings, and the first jockey was himself a king.”). 
3 See Drape, supra note 1. 
4 Country House Wins Kentucky Derby After Favorite DQ’d, REUTERS (May 4, 2019, 
4:25 PM), https://ca.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idCAKCN1SA0SV-OCASP [https:// 
perma.cc/NR7C-HTES]. 
T 
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Maximum Security’s owners even received a bouquet of roses, as it 
appeared the horse was the clear winner.5 After a twenty-two-minute 
review of the race, the stewards disqualified Maximum Security for 
interference and declared Country House, a horse at sixty-five-to-one 
odds, the official winner of the Kentucky Derby.6 After the 
disqualification, the bouquet of roses was taken away from Maximum 
Security’s co-owner, Mary West, and placed around the neck of 
Country House.7 The Derby’s outcome stunned thousands of 
individuals in attendance at Churchill Downs, resulted in a chorus of 
boos from the crowd,8 and left the co-owners of Maximum Security in 
disbelief.9 
The impact of the stewards’ momentous disqualification decision 
was enormous. Patrons lost millions of dollars in bets on Maximum 
Security due to the reversal of the race’s finish.10 Maximum Security’s 
co-owner, Gary West, called the disqualification decision “the most 
egregious disqualification decision in the history of horse racing.”11 
5 Rick Bozich, Country House’s DQ Victory No Roses for Kentucky Derby, WDRB.COM 
(May 4, 2019), https://www.wdrb.com/derby_145/bozich-country-house-s-dq-victory-no-
roses-for-kentucky/article_69334fc0-6edb-11e9-9c3c-ffb2d11ba2eb.html [https://perma. 
cc/9TSM-TYEF].  
6 Francesca Paris, Country House, A 65-1 Long Shot, Wins Kentucky Derby After 
Historic Disqualification, NPR (May 4, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/04/ 
720315488/country-house-a-65-1-long-shot-wins-kentucky-derby-after-historic-
disqualificati [https://perma.cc/48GL-JGCZ]. 
7 Chuck Culpepper, ‘The Worst Thing You Can Do Is Rush’: Inside the Strangest 
22 Minutes in Kentucky Derby History, WASH. POST (May 6, 2019, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/the-worst-thing-you-can-do-is-rush-inside-the-
strangest-22-minutes-in-kentucky-derby-history/2019/05/06/54e011b0-701c-11e9-8be0-
ca575670e91c_story.html [https://perma.cc/X7CR-99Y7]. 
8 Robert Kieckhefer, Controversy Swirls Over Kentucky Derby Finish After 
Disqualification, UPI (May 4, 2019, 10:28 PM), https://www.upi.com/Sports_News/2019/ 
05/04/Controversy-swirls-over-Kentucky-Derby-finish-after-disqualification/5261557013745/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZQS9-TT6A]. 
9 Scott Stump, Maximum Security Owner Says He Will Appeal Kentucky Derby 
Disqualification, TODAY (May 6, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.today.com/news/ 
maximum-security-owner-gary-west-will-appeal-kentucky-derby-disqualification-t153573 
[https://perma.cc/6ASE-ARGC] (quoting the reaction of Gary West, the owner of Maximum 
Security, as “[w]e were stunned, shocked, and in complete disbelief”). 
10 Jenna West, Maximum Security’s Kentucky Derby Disqualification Cost Bettors $9 
Million, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 5, 2019), https://www.si.com/horse-racing/2019/05/ 
05/maximum-security-kentucky-derby-disqualification-bets-money-lost [https://perma.cc/ 
L25G-M49D]. 
11 Gary B. Graves, Maximum Security Owner Weighs Legal Options After ‘Egregious’ 
Kentucky Derby Result, WASH. TIMES (May 5, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2019/may/5/gary-west-maximum-security-owner-weighs-legal-opti/ [https://perma. 
cc/BSZ3-GDQK]. 
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A chorus of individuals has criticized the decision,12 including 
President Donald Trump, who expressed his disagreement with the 
decision in a tweet.13 Despite this criticism, many horse racing experts 
have opined that the stewards made the appropriate decision under the 
circumstances.14 
On May 6, 2019, Mr. West promptly appealed the stewards’ 
disqualification decision, but the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission 
almost immediately denied West’s appeal.15 On May 14, 2019, Mr. and 
Mrs. West filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky. They alleged, among other things, that the 
Kentucky Horse Racing Commission violated their procedural due 
process rights, and that the stewards abused their discretion in 
12 E.g., Dick Jerardi, Maximum Security, the Best Horse in the Kentucky Derby, 
Shouldn’t Have Been Disqualified, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 4, 2019), https://www.inquirer. 
com/sports/kentucky-derby-maximum-security-disqualification-analysis-country-house-
20190505.html [https://perma.cc/2HFZ-ERES]; Andy Nesbitt, Kentucky Derby: 
Controversial Ruling Is a Gigantic Embarrassment to the Sport of Horse Racing, 
USA TODAY (May 4, 2019, 7:58 PM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2019/05/kentucky- 
derby-maximum-security-embarrassing-finish-ruling [https://perma.cc/L36J-ZT6D]; Dan 
Wolken, Opinion: Maximum Security Was Robbed at Kentucky Derby, Yet Another Black 
Eye in Horse Racing, USA TODAY (May 4, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/sports/columnist/dan-wolken/2019/05/04/kentucky-derby-2019-maximum-security-
robbed-racing-takes-another-hit/1105796001/ [https://perma.cc/J4U2-HE8V]. 
13 Ryan Gaydos, Kentucky Derby Appeal of Disqualification Ruling Denied by Officials, 
FOX NEWS (May 6, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/sports/kentucky-derby-maximum-
security-owner-total-disbelief [https://perma.cc/Q4GF-T5SL]. President Donald Trump 
tweeted the following: 
The Kentucky Derby decision was not a good one . . . . It was a rough and tumble 
race on a wet and sloppy track, actually, a beautiful thing to watch. Only in these 
days of political correctness could such an overturn occur. The best horse did NOT 
win the Kentucky Derby — not even close! 
Id. 
14 E.g., Mike Brunker, Kentucky Derby Disqualification Was the Right Call, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J. (May 7, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/sports-columns/ 
mike-brunker/kentucky-derby-disqualification-was-the-right-call-1658190/ [https://perma. 
cc/W6JP-GAQW]; Andrew Cohen, The Kentucky Derby Decision Might Avert Disaster, 
ATLANTIC (May 6, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/kentucky-
derby-decision-may-avert-disaster/588814/ [https://perma.cc/HAE3-2MJY]; Gregory A. 
Hall, Kentucky Derby Opinion: Right Call, Wrong Process, BLOODHORSE (May 5, 2019), 
https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/233517/kentucky-derby-opinion-right-
call-wrong-process [https://perma.cc/6T9N-6W5T]; Joshua M. Silverstein, On the Kentucky 
Derby Disqualification, NW. ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (May 12, 2019, 1:59 AM), 
https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2019/may/12/on-the-kentucky-derby-disqualification-/ 
[https://perma.cc/ND2P-ZNTS]. 
15 Gary B. Graves, Commission Denies Maximum Security Disqualification Appeal, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 6, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/304ba0fea57540a5b13651fd 
772d6b75 [https://perma.cc/U4M4-XUWD].  
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disqualifying Maximum Security.16 Because of the highly 
controversial nature of the stewards’ disqualification decision, it is no 
surprise that litigation ensued to contest the outcome of the race.  
West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission illustrates a situation 
that has occurred surprisingly often in horse racing throughout the 
years: a disqualification decision in a horse race that results in a lawsuit. 
Legal scholars have written extensively on the subject of horse racing, 
including articles about the historical and legal development of horse 
racing,17 the trainer responsibility rule in horse racing,18 medication 
rules for racehorses,19 the issue of performance-enhancing drugs and 
steroids in horse racing,20 and the regulation of horse racing in 
general.21 Multiple legal scholars have published works relating to the 
sale of horses.22 This Article makes a novel contribution to the law 
16 Complaint at 5, 27, West v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, No. 5:19-cv-00211-KKC 
(E.D. Ky. May 14, 2019) [hereinafter West Complaint]. 
17 E.g., Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” in Defense of “The Law of the Horse”: 
The Historical and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 473 (2004). 
18 E.g., Bennett Liebman, The Trainer Responsibility Rule in Horse Racing, 7 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2007). 
19 E.g., Laurel Benson, Note, Down the Stretch: Reining in State Approaches Toward a 
Universal Medication Rule for Racehorses, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 155 (2012); Alexandra D. Logsdon, Note, Unbridled “Spirits”: An Integrated Analysis
of the Law, the Science, and the Future of Thoroughbred Medication, 6 KY. J. EQUINE,
AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 141 (2014).
20 E.g., Kyle Cassidy, Comment, Reining in the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs 
in Horseracing: Why a Federal Regulation is Needed, 24 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
121, 123 (2014); Cody M. Conner, Note, Thoroughbred Horse Racing: Why a Uniform 
Approach to Drug Regulation Is Necessary, 10 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 111, 114 (2018); Bradley S. Friedman, Oats, Water, Hay and Everything Else: The
Regulation of Anabolic Steroids in Thoroughbred Horse Racing, 16 ANIMAL L. 123, 123
(2009); Jennifer M. Jabroski, Note, Reining in the Horse Racing Industry: A Proposal for
Federal Regulation of Steroid Use in Racehorses, 1 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 67, 67–68 (2009); Amy L. (Williams) Kluesner, And They’re Off:
Eliminating Drug Use in Thoroughbred Racing, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 298
(2012); Kjirsten Lee, Transgressing Trainers and Enhanced Equines: Drug Use in
Racehorses, Difficulty Assigning Responsibility and the Need for a National Racing
Commission, 11 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 23, 23 (2015); John T. Wendt, Horse
Racing in the United States: A Call for a Harmonized Approach to Anti-Doping Regulation,
25 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 176, 176 (2015).
21 See, e.g., Luke P. Breslin, Comment, Reclaiming the Glory in the “Sport of Kings” – 
Uniformity Is the Answer, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 299 (2010); Courtney 
D. Hall, Track Conditions Uncertain: Analyzing the Need for the NLRB to Reassess Its
Denial of Jurisdiction over the Horse Racing Industry, 20 SPORTS L.J. 71, 72 (2013).
22 See, e.g., Anne I. Bandes, Note, Saddled with a Lame Horse? Why State Consumer 
Protection Laws Can Be the Best Protection for Duped Horse Purchasers, 44 B.C. L. REV. 
789, 789 (2003); Frank T. Becker, Non-Uniform Statutes Governing the Sale of Horses, 
8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 1 (2016); Zachary T. Broome et al., 
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review literature on horse racing by comprehensively examining the 
various grounds for litigation in racehorse disqualifications.23 
Part I of this Article discusses cases in which the grounds for horse 
disqualifications have been litigated. With questions ranging from 
horse eligibility, to failed drug tests, interference, riding fouls, and 
other miscellaneous grounds, disqualification occurs in a variety of 
unique situations. Part II of this Article examines the claims made in 
West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission and analyzes the 
possibility that the official outcome of the 2019 Kentucky Derby will 
be overturned. This Article concludes that, consistent with the findings 
in the vast majority of cases throughout the country, the official results 
of the 2019 Kentucky Derby will likely not be overturned because the 
stewards’ disqualification of Maximum Security was not arbitrary and 
capricious. 
I 
GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF HORSES 
Numerous cases from jurisdictions throughout the United States 
demonstrate the variety of reasons why horses may be disqualified 
before or after the conclusion of a race. In some cases, officials may 
find a horse ineligible for entry due to noncompliance with the racing 
rules in that particular jurisdiction. In other cases, a horse may fail a 
drug test. Officials may also disqualify horses due to interference or 
fouls committed during the actual running of the race. Finally, several 
cases involve unique fact patterns and disqualification questions, such 
as two horses wearing each other’s saddle numbers during a race,24 
Equine “Lemon” Law, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 289, 290 (2013); John J. Kropp et al., Horse 
Sense and the UCC: The Purchase of Racehorses, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 171, 171 (1991); 
Sarah R. Sandberg, Comment, Globalized Horse Trade: A Need for Heightened 
Sophistication in the Equine Industry, 69 UMKC L. REV. 613, 613 (2001). 
23 An outstanding law review article was written in 2005 by Professor Bennett Liebman 
that analyzes several cases wherein the courts upheld decisions by state horse racing 
commissions reversing the stewards’ decisions. Several of the cases discussed in that article 
involved disqualifications, but this Article is the first to my knowledge that has 
comprehensively reviewed decisions with a specific focus on disqualifications. See Bennett 
Liebman, Reversing the Refs: An Argument for Limited Review in Horse Racing, 6 TEX. 
REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23 (2005). 
24 Tex. Racing Comm’n v. Marquez, No. 03-09-00635-CV, 2011 WL 3659092, at *1 
(Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011). 
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a jockey possessing a prohibited device,25 and an error in a horse’s 
handicap.26 
A. Horse Eligibility
In the Pennsylvania case Racing GAMbit, LLC v. State Horse Racing 
Commission, the issue was Cousin Stephen’s eligibility to race at 
Philadelphia PARX.27 Although Cousin Stephen ran and won the fifth 
race at Philadelphia PARX on September 25, 2016, his win was 
challenged on eligibility grounds.28  
Cousin Stephen had been purchased in a claiming race29 in New 
York at Saratoga Race Course less than one month earlier on August 
31, 2016.30 According to a New York horse racing regulation, a 
claimed horse “shall not race outside New York State for a period of 
[thirty] days from the date of the claim or the end of the meeting at 
which it was claimed, whichever period of time is longer.”31 The claim 
meeting for Cousin Stephen ended on September 4, 2016, which meant 
that, under the rules, Cousin Stephen was technically ineligible to run 
at Philadelphia PARX on September 25, 2016.32 
25 Jackson v. Ark. Racing Comm’n, 34 S.W.3d 740, 741 (Ark. 2001). 
26 Kaufman v. Sarafan, 452 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (N.Y. 1983); Kaufman v. Sarafan, 457 
N.Y.S.2d 69, 69 (App. Div. 1982). 
27 Racing GAMbit, LLC v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 184 A.3d 192, 193 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2018). 
28 Id. 
29 Horse Betting: Claiming Races, US RACING, https://www.usracing.com/horse-
betting/claiming-race [https://perma.cc/2XM9-W2F3] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
This website explains a claiming race as follows: 
A claiming race means that the horses may be purchased by a licensed owner for 
the claiming price listed for that race. Every track has certain claiming guidelines, 
but generally there are certain rules that apply. As well as being licensed, the 
person making the claim also must have enough money in their horsemens’ 
bookkeeper account to pay for the horse, and they must have a trainer to pick up 
the horse after the race. To make the actual claim, the owner or his authorized agent 
will fill out a “claim slip” with the relevant information (date, race, horse name, 
owner name, etc.) and deposit the slip in the claim box. There is usually a deadline 
to drop your claim, generally [fifteen] minutes to post. In the event of [sic] more 
than one owner drops a claim on the same horse, the racing official in charge of 
claims, the claims clerk, will conduct a “shake” to determine who will become the 
new owner. The shake involves putting numbered pills, one representing each 
owner, in the pill bottle and pulling out a winning number. The horse is then picked 
up by its new owner/trainer after the race. 
Id. 
30 Racing GAMbit, LLC, 184 A.3d at 193–94. 
31 Id. at 193. 
32 Id. 
2020] Disqualifications in Horse Racing 553
Nevertheless, the stewards declared Cousin Stephen the official 
winner of the race prior to receiving any challenge to his eligibility.33 
Eleven days after the race, the owner of Richie’s Rich—the second-
place horse—informed the chief steward that Cousin Stephen was 
ineligible.34 The stewards ruled that Cousin Stephen could not be 
disqualified because the protest was not timely received.35 Following 
an appeal by the owner of Richie’s Rich, the Pennsylvania State Horse 
Racing Commission overturned the final race result on February 28, 
2017, disqualified Cousin Stephen, and ordered the winnings of the 
race to be redistributed.36 
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed the Commission’s 
ruling and concluded that the Commission went beyond merely 
examining the stewards’ discretionary authority by “evaluat[ing] the 
merits of the appeal.”37 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court also 
noted that the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission 
regulations grant stewards “the authority and discretion to handle 
matters in front of them” and the power to “disallow an untimely 
protest regarding racing qualifications or entries.”38 The Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court concluded that the “Commission erred as a 
matter of law in addressing the merits of the appeal after already 
concluding that the stewards did not abuse their discretion.”39 Thus, 
Cousin Stephen retained his first-place finish.40 
In another case, the court upheld the stewards’ postrace decision to 
disqualify a horse named The Noble Player from the Henry P. Russell 
Handicap—a horse race in California—on eligibility grounds.41 The 
Henry P. Russell Handicap had an eligibility restriction in place that 
limited the race to horses under three years old that had not won more 
than $25,000 in the year.42 Unknown to the stewards before the race, 
The Noble Player did not meet those eligibility requirements. Earlier 
that year, The Noble Player had placed first in the San Matean 
Handicap on September 15, 1984, winning a $22,400 share of the 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 194. 
37 Id. at 197. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 197–98. 
41 Sangster v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 249 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239–40 (Ct. App. 1988). 
42 Id. at 236. 
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statutory $35,000 purse and a $2,700 portion of the Breeder’s Cup 
Award for placing first in the race.43 Thus, The Noble Player’s total 
winnings were $25,100.44  
Ten days after the Henry P. Russell Handicap, an employee of the 
Santa Anita Race Track read in a magazine article that The Noble 
Player earned $25,100 in the San Matean Handicap.45 The employee 
informed an official of the Oak Tree Racing Association, which 
sponsors the Henry P. Russell Handicap, and then the information was 
forwarded to the board of stewards.46 The stewards subsequently 
disqualified The Noble Player, and the California Horse Racing Board 
upheld the disqualification.47 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals examined the 
disqualification’s timeliness. The owner of The Noble Player argued 
that protests must be submitted to the stewards within seventy-two 
hours of the race, pursuant to Rule 1754 of the California 
Administrative Code applicable to horse racing.48 Rule 1754 stated that 
the protest must be made by a “protestor,” but the relevant definition 
of a “protestor” did not include stewards.49 
The California Horse Racing Board contended that two other 
applicable rules justified the stewards’ disqualification of The Noble 
Player. First, Rule 1750 gave the stewards the power to “make diligent 
inquiry or investigation into any complaint, objection or protest made 
either upon their own motion, by any racing official, or by any other 
person empowered by this chapter to make such complaint, protest or 
objection.”50 Second, Rule 1592 provided that “[a]ny horse ineligible 
to be entered for a race, or ineligible to start in any race, who competes 
in such race may be disqualified and the stewards may discipline 
anyone responsible therefor.”51 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 236–37. 
48 Id. at 237. Rule 1754 stated the following: “A protest against any horse which has 
started in a race, shall be made to the stewards in writing, signed by the protestor, within 72 
hours of the race exclusive of non-racing days of the meeting.” Id. 
49 Id. at 237–38. Rule 1756 stated the following: “A jockey, driver, trainer or owner of 
a horse which is entered for or is a starter in a race is empowered to file an objection or 
protest against any other horse in such race . . . .” Id. 
50 Id. at 237. 
51 Id. 
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In analyzing those rules, the California Court of Appeals noted that 
the rules generally “confer a broad flexibility and discretion to resolve 
questions of eligibility.”52 Thus, the Sangster court held that a seventy-
two-hour requirement for protests would impede the broad flexibility 
and discretion of stewards, and, therefore, the stewards in the case acted 
within a reasonable time in disqualifying The Noble Player.53 
In Helad Farms v. Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission, 
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court overturned the disqualification 
of an owner’s racehorses for failure to make staking payments when an 
employee waived the payment deadline for one owner at the 
disadvantage of other similarly situated horse owners.54 In the Helad 
Farms case, the racehorse owner engaged a New York staking agent to 
make staking payments55 in various jurisdictions to ensure the owner’s 
horses were eligible to race.56 Although the staking agent timely 
submitted the racehorse owner’s staking payment checks to the 
Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission, the checks were 
facially defective.57 
On June 3, 1982, the State Harness Racing Commission eventually 
gave the staking agent twenty-four hours to correct the staking 
payments.58 The administrator of the Pennsylvania Sire Stakes Fund—
allegedly without the authorization of the State Harness Racing 
Commission—purportedly accepted a hand-delivered payment on or 
about June 3, 1982, from another horse owner for eight horses after that 
horse owner had learned of the defaults in the staking payments by the 
staking agent.59 Because the administrator of the Fund did not 
personally contact the other affected horse owners by June 3, 1982, 
they were not aware of the defaults by the staking agent; consequently, 
52 Id. at 238. 
53 Id. 
54 Helad Farms v. Pa. State Harness Racing Comm’n, 470 A.2d 181, 181 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1984). 
55 Id. at 183. The Helad Farms court described staking payments as follows: 
In order to qualify for entry in the races supervised by the Commission, certain 
periodic nominating and sustaining payments must be made into the Pennsylvania 
Sire Stakes Fund (Fund) for each horse which the owner intends to race in the Sire 
events. These staking payments are to be made for each horse as a yearling in order 
to qualify that horse to run as a two or three year old. 
Id. at 182. 
56 Id. at 183. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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the Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission made the decision 
to disqualify nineteen horses.60  
The Helad Farms court overturned the decision of the Pennsylvania 
State Harness Racing Commission and emphasized the Commission’s 
duty to avoid preferential treatment as follows: 
[T]he duty of the Commission to avoid conduct . . . which would
reflect negatively on the sport includes the obligation to avoid
preferential treatment among horse owners whether wittingly or
unwittingly. A preference, whether innocently or culpably granted, is
generally the same in the eyes of the skeptic, and to the skeptical
world is the equivalent of intentional preference. Such a preference,
regardless of how effected, is unacceptable and, we believe, outside
the scope of the Commission’s discretion. While the default of the
current agent is not the Commission’s responsibility, avoidance of
preferential treatment is. This could simply have been avoided by
enforcement of its rules, rather than the granting to [the administrator
of the Pennsylvania Sire Stakes Fund the] discretion to waive them.61
Thus, the Helad Farms court held “that the waiver of payment 
deadlines in this case, resulting to the advantage of one owner and thus 
to the disadvantage of others similarly represented, cannot be 
approved.”62 
In Heavner v. Illinois Racing Board, an issue arose from entry of the 
horse Brookes Pride into the Cardinal Stakes race on May 28, 1980, in 
Illinois.63 In Heavner, an entry blank for Brookes Pride was not found 
in the entry box for the Cardinal Stakes at Sportsman Park.64 The owner 
of Brookes Pride contended the racing officials made a mistake, so the 
owner filed another entry blank for Brookes Pride.65 The race stewards 
rejected the new entry.66 The owner of Brookes Pride then filed a 
temporary restraining order—which was granted—enjoining the 
Sportsman Park management from interfering with Brookes Pride’s 
participation in the race.67 The trial court eventually reversed the 
decision of the Illinois Racing Board to disqualify Brookes Pride.68 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 184. 
62 Id. at 185. 
63 Heavner v. Ill. Racing Bd., 432 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 292. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 290. 
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Brookes Pride was thus allowed to run the race and finished second, 
winning a more than $60,000 share of the purse.69 The owner of 
Brookes Pride contended that, because four of the Illinois Racing 
Board’s rules were violated, the Board had waived strict compliance 
with the entry rules.70 In analyzing these arguments, the Illinois Court 
of Appeals focused in particular on Rule 12.21, which requires that a 
state steward or designated representative open the entry box for a 
race.71 The owner of Brookes Pride made the claim that neither a 
steward nor a representative of the steward was present at the opening 
of the Cardinal Stakes’ entry box.72 The Heavner court held that, 
because Rule 12.21 ensures “the integrity of the entry process,” the 
Illinois Racing Board made a reversible error by disregarding the part 
of the rule that requires a steward or steward’s representative to open 
the entry box.73 Thus, the Heavner court found the Illinois Racing 
Board arbitrarily applied the rules.74  
The Racing GAMbit LLC and Sangster cases illustrate a trend that 
has emerged from horse racing litigation: courts will generally uphold 
the postrace disqualification of a horse. An exception to that trend 
arises, however, when state horse racing boards and commissions apply 
rules arbitrarily, which occurred in the Helad Farms and Heavner 
cases. 
B. Drug Testing
Another reoccurring basis for litigation arises from disqualifications 
based on drug tests that indicate the presence of a prohibited foreign 
substance in the horse. Although numerous lawsuits have challenged 
drug test disqualifications, the courts have routinely upheld those 
disqualification decisions. 
Owners of disqualified horses have presented a number of different 
arguments in seeking to overturn disqualification decisions based on 
failed drug tests. One argument is that the presence of the substance did 
not have a material effect on the outcome of the race. An excellent 
recent example of this can be found in the facts of Ciresa v. 
69 Id. at 292. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 293. The Heavner court noted that Rule 12.21 stated: “The entry box shall be 
opened by the state steward, or his designated representative, at the advertised time. The 
state steward will be responsible to see that at least one horseman . . .  is present.” Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 294–95. 
74 Id. at 294. 
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Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission.75 In Ciresa, the horse 
Cosmic Destiny was disqualified from a first-place showing in a race 
at Philadelphia PARX on October 11, 2016. Cosmic Destiny was 
disqualified after testing positive for carisoprodol, a prohibited muscle 
relaxant.76 The Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission even 
acknowledged that both sides of the expert testimony before the 
Commission revealed that the amount of carisoprodol found in the 
horse did not affect the horse’s performance.77 Despite the fact that the 
carisoprodol appeared to have no effect on the race, the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court upheld the Commission’s affirmation of the 
stewards’ disqualification because the very fact that carisprodol was in 
the horse violated the Commission’s regulation.78 Thus, even though 
the regulation effectively imposed strict liability, the disqualification 
was appropriate.79 
In some cases, a horse owner’s failure to strictly comply with the 
rules and regulations of a state racing commission can result in the 
courts upholding a stewards’ disqualification decision. In Glen Hill 
Farm, LLC v. California Horse Racing Board, the owner of a horse 
named Augment failed to timely file objections with the stewards as to 
Medici Code’s qualifications to compete in the 2007 Del Mar Derby.80 
Although Medici Code placed first in the Derby, Medici Code was 
subsequently disqualified from two prior races (a second-place 
showing in the Oceanside Stakes and a first-place showing in the La 
Jolla Handicap) due to positive test results for clenbuterol,81 
75 Ciresa v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, No. 1155 C.D. 2017, 2019 WL 237414 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2019). 
76 Id. at *1–2. 
77 Id. at *3–4. 
78 Id. at *6–7. 
79 Id. 
80 Glen Hill Farm, LLC v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
81 See Kentucky Equine Research Staff, Clenbuterol Banned in Quarter Horse Racing, 
EQUINEWS (Jan. 12, 2015), https://ker.com/equinews/clenbuterol-banned-quarter-horse-
racing/ [https://perma.cc/M9FD-HJTU].  
Clenbuterol (trade name Ventipulmin®) is a bronchilator that is helpful for horses 
with heaves, an inflammatory condition that causes the airways to constrict. Horses 
with heaves have a hard time exhaling and are often intolerant of exercise.  
Figuring that more air would be a benefit to racehorses, trainers have sometimes 
given clenbuterol to horses that did not have heaves. Use of this drug has not been 
shown to have a beneficial effect on breathing in healthy horses. Some side effects 
such as increased muscle mass, however, are believed to have a performance-
enhancing role. 
Id. 
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a prohibited substance.82 The owner of Augment contended that 
Medici Code should not be the winner of the Del Mar Derby because 
had Medici Code been disqualified prior to the Del Mar Derby, it would 
never have qualified to enter the race.83 
The California Court of Appeals in Glen Hill Farm, LLC remarked 
that an applicable rule stated that “the time limitation on the filing of 
protests shall not apply in any case in which fraud or willful misconduct 
is alleged provided that the stewards are satisfied that the allegations 
are bonafide [sic] and susceptible of verification.”84 The owner of 
Augment failed to make an objection to the stewards on the basis of 
“fraud or willful misconduct” prior to filing objections with the 
California Board of Horse Racing.85 Because of this failure to file an 
objection to the stewards, the owner of Augment waived any right to a 
hearing before the California Board of Horse Racing.86 
Racehorse owners have also lodged constitutional challenges to the 
applicability of the rules regarding foreign substances in horses. In 
Johnson v. Board of Stewards of Charles Town Races, Eastern Delite, 
the winner of a race at the 2007 West Virginia Breeders Classic, was 
disqualified for a positive caffeine drug test.87 The West Virginia 
Racing Commission had a rule in effect that prohibited “any drug 
substance . . . foreign to the natural horse.”88  
The owners of Eastern Delite contended the zero tolerance rule for 
foreign substances was arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional, 
because the evidence in the case indicated the caffeine in Eastern Delite 
had no effect on the performance of the horse.89 The Supreme Court of 
West Virginia cited with approval90 the Illinois Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Kline v. Illinois Racing Board, which upheld the 
constitutionality of a similar rule prohibiting “any foreign substance” 
in a horse.91 The Kline court reasoned that there was no reliable 
scientific method to calculate the effect of a substance on a horse in any 
given race, and that if horse racing boards and courts could consider 
82 Glen Hill Farm, LLC, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552–53. 
83 Id. at 553. 
84 Id. at 556. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Johnson v. Bd. of Stewards of Charles Town Races, 693 S.E.2d 93, 94 (W. Va. 2010). 
88 Id. (emphasis in original).  
89 Id. at 95. 
90 Id. at 98. 
91 Kline v. Ill. Racing Bd., 469 N.E.2d 667, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
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the particular effects of a substance on any horse, then this “would 
necessarily result in almost endless conflicts before the winner of a race 
could be declared.”92 These conflicts would likely arise between 
medical experts before the Board of Horse Racing and legal experts in 
the courts.93 As the Supreme Court of West Virginia remarked, “[T]he 
winner of a horse race would not be determined by the speed of the 
horses on the track, but by the dexterity of experts and lawyers in the 
courtroom.”94 The Supreme Court of West Virginia held that the zero 
tolerance rule “is a reasonable method of preventing horses from being 
raced when they have drugs in their system.”95 
Horse owners have also raised arguments based on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”96 In Giles v. Washington 
Horse Racing Commission, a rule promulgated by the Washington 
State Horse Racing Commission prohibited the medication 
phenylbutazone for two-year-old horses but not older horses.97 The 
Washington Court of Appeals upheld the regulation on rational basis 
review, noting that the “rule obviously applies equally to all owners of 
[two]-year old horses,” and that the Washington State Horse Racing 
Commission is entrusted with the authority to establish rules and 
regulations for horse racing within the state.98 Finding a rational basis 
existed for the regulation, the Giles court noted that “the appropriate 
medication for horses entered in races is clearly of legitimate concern 
to the Commission.”99 
In another case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected an equal 
protection argument in Allen v. Kentucky Horse Racing Authority.100 
In Allen, the State of Kentucky’s regulations prohibited the medication 
flunixin in harness racing but not in thoroughbred racing.101 The 
Kentucky Horse Racing Authority held an administrative hearing about 
the disqualification of CR Commando from two harness races that took 
92 Id. at 672. 
93 Id. 
94 Johnson, 693 S.E.2d at 98. 
95 Id. 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
97 Giles v. Wash. Horse Racing Comm’n, 771 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
98 Id. at 1162. 
99 Id. 
100 Allen v. Ky. Horse Racing Auth., 136 S.W.3d 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
101 Id. at 63. 
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place in October 1998.102 At that hearing, a veterinarian with the 
Kentucky Horse Racing Authority testified that harness racing and 
thoroughbred racing are different, and that “the harness industry had to 
be careful that it did not allow a sore horse or a lame horse to mask its 
pain in a race because of the possibility of hurting other horses in the 
field in the event of an accident.”103 The Allen court then concluded a 
rational basis existed to treat the harness and thoroughbred racing 
industries differently.104 
In addition, horse owners have alleged due process violations arising 
from disqualifications based on the presence of foreign substances. 
The constitutional right to due process requires notice as well as a 
“meaningful opportunity to be heard.”105 In Maryland Racing 
Commission v. Belotti, the owner of La Beau—a horse disqualified 
after testing positive for the prohibited drug furosemide—received no 
notice of the stewards’ disqualification hearing.106 Despite the lack of 
notice for the stewards’ hearing, the owner was given notice for a de 
novo administrative hearing concerning the disqualification before the 
Maryland Racing Commission.107 The Maryland Court of Appeals 
ultimately held that no due process violation had occurred.108 
C. Interference and Riding Fouls
In addition to disqualification decisions based upon the presence of 
a foreign substance in a horse, a number of courts have reviewed 
disqualification decisions for interference and fouls that allegedly 
occurred during a race. 
Courts typically uphold the disqualification decisions of both 
stewards and racing commissions in cases that involve either 
interference or riding fouls. A typical case exemplifying this rule is 
Jones v. New Mexico State Racing Commission.109 In the Jones case, 
the owner of a horse named Rule the Deck challenged the stewards’ 
decision to disqualify Rule the Deck as winner of the 1982 World’s 
Championship Quarter Horse Classic horse race, which took place on 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 64. 
105 LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998). 
106 Md. Racing Comm’n v. Belotti, 744 A.2d 558, 564–65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). 
107 Id. at 572–73. 
108 Id. at 576–78. 
109 Jones v. N.M. State Racing Comm’n, 671 P.2d 1145 (N.M. 1983). 
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August 1, 1982.110 The stewards had disqualified Rule the Deck for 
“whipping” and “bumping” another horse approximately seventy-five 
yards after the start of the race.111 On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico found the New Mexico State Racing Commission 
provided adequate notice112 and an impartial hearing113 to the horse 
owner, and that the disqualification decision was supported by 
substantial evidence.114 In particular, the Jones court found the New 
Mexico State Racing Commission “viewed the film of the race, heard 
testimony, and considered other evidence concerning the running of the 
race”; thus, the disqualification was upheld by substantial evidence and 
was not arbitrary and capricious.115 
Judicial deference to stewards’ decisions may even extend to 
situations in which the stewards have acknowledged a decisional 
error.116 On August 2, 1986, during a race at the Saratoga Race Course, 
the racehorse Allumeuse was wrongly disqualified for a foul that was 
actually committed by another horse.117 This mistake was even 
acknowledged by the stewards of the race.118 Subsequently, in Cramer 
v. New York State Racing Association, a group of pari-mutuel ticket
holders filed suit against the New York State Racing Association and
sought to have the result overturned and Allumeuse declared the
official winner of the race.119
The ticket holders contended that the New York State Racing and 
Wagering Board acted arbitrarily in declining to reverse the stewards’ 
disqualification decision.120 Despite the clear and unequivocal mistake 
by the stewards, an appellate court in New York noted that the New 
York State Racing and Wagering Board authorized the stewards to 
resolve all race objections and to declare an official winner.121 The 
110 Id. at 1146–47. 
111 Id. at 1147. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 1148. 
114 Id. at 1149. 
115 Id. 
116 See Cramer v. N.Y. State Racing Ass’n, 525 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1988). 
117 Jerry Bossert, The Day at the Races: July 5, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 5, 2011, 4:00 
AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/more-sports/day-races-july-5-article-1.158725 
[https://perma.cc/74FV-2B5J]. 
118 Bill Christine, Horse Racing / Bill Christine: Saratoga Stewards Stew in Their Wrong 
Choice, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1986, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1986-08-14-sp-6981-story.html [https://perma.cc/GQG4-J99K]. 
119 Cramer, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 940. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 941. 
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court noted that “the Stewards have been granted the final word 
concerning the official outcome of a race insofar as the pari-mutuel 
payoff is concerned,” and, therefore, the official results could not be 
overturned by the court.122 
In some cases, the owner of a non-first-place horse may object to the 
stewards that the first-place horse interfered. Such was the case in 
Lerman v. State Horse Racing Commission—a case that resulted from 
a thoroughbred horse race at Philadelphia PARX on January 31, 
2017.123 In the Lerman case, the stewards did not disqualify the winner 
of the race because a bump between the first-place horse, Big Saver, 
and the second-place horse, S.S. Minnow, did not affect the outcome 
of the race.124 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld the 
stewards’ decision, holding that “the bumping between Big Saver and 
S.S. Minnow was generally-accepted contact incidental to horse racing 
that did not alter the Race’s outcome.”125 
Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a stewards’ finding of 
no interference in Miller v. Ohio State Racing Commission.126 The 
owner of the horse named Bobby M. contended that another horse, 
Wall Street Dancer, interfered with Bobby M. during the Miller High 
Life Cradle Stakes race on September 3, 1990.127 The stewards 
disallowed the objection, and the Ohio State Racing Commission 
affirmed the stewards’ decision.128 
In reviewing the Commission’s decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that both sides presented “substantial evidence” 
supporting their conclusions about the interference.129 In essence, each 
side presented an equally plausible case. The Miller court ultimately 
held in its most significant finding that the Ohio State Racing 
122 Id. The Court also reasoned that “[t]his ‘rule of finality’ pertains only to the pari-
mutuel payoff and, given the anonymous nature of the betting transaction, is necessary to 
preserve the financial integrity of the pari-mutuel system.” Id. (citation omitted). 
123 Lerman v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, No. 1362 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 3431796 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. July 17, 2018). 
124 Id. at *1. 
125 Id. at *6. 
126 Miller v. Ohio State Racing Comm’n, No. 94APE06-886, 1995 WL 89696 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Feb. 28, 1995). 
127 Id. at *1. 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at *3 (“The foregoing testimony, if believed, is substantial, reliable and probative 
evidence that not only was Wall Street Dancer clear of Bobby M. at the time of the alleged 
infraction, but that nothing in the way Madrid handled Wall Street Dancer impeded, 
intimidated or interfered with Bobby M. We fully recognize, however, that appellant 
presented substantial evidence to the contrary.”). 
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Commission committed no error in upholding the stewards’ final 
decision that interference did not occur.130 
Courts will also reject challenges to the stewards’ non-
disqualification decision if the horse owner fails to timely appeal. In 
Heft v. Maryland Racing Commission, the thoroughbred horse named 
Pulverizing finished second to Diamond Donnie in the Dancing Count 
Stakes on February 4, 1989.131 The owner of Pulverizing appealed to 
the Maryland Racing Commission, alleging Diamond Donnie 
interfered with two other horses in the race and that the interference 
should have disqualified Diamond Donnie.132 The objection was not 
filed within the time limit specified by a regulation that required 
objections to be made before the owner’s jockey passed the scales.133 
The Heft court specifically noted that “[t]here is no provision in the 
regulations for excusing the time limits set forth in the regulations on 
the ground that neither the owner nor the trainer nor the jockey saw the 
violation of the Commission’s rules.”134 Because the owner of 
Pulverizing did not file a timely objection—nor did the stewards take 
any action—the owner was not entitled to an appeal.135 
At least one state supreme court—the Supreme Court of Montana—
has overturned a stewards’ disqualification decision for interference on 
due process grounds.136 In Smith v. Board of Horse Racing, Mickey’s 
Hot Sauce was disqualified from first place for alleged interference in 
a thoroughbred horse race at the Budweiser Derby during the Montana 
State Fair.137 The owner of Mickey’s Hot Sauce appealed the stewards’ 
decision to the Board of Horse Racing, which upheld the stewards’ 
disqualification ruling.138 
In the Smith case, the stewards discussed the incident with the 
trainers of two other horses who were given the opportunity to present 
their arguments.139 The owner of Mickey’s Hot Sauce, however, was 
not given an opportunity to discuss the incident with the stewards.140 
The Smith court held that this was a violation of due process, and that 
130 Id. 
131 Heft v. Md. Racing Comm’n, 592 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Md. 1991). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1114. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1115. 
136 See Smith v. Bd. of Horse Racing, 956 P.2d 752 (Mont. 1998). 
137 Id. at 753. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 753–54. 
140 Id. 
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it was an error for the Board of Horse Racing to defer to the stewards’ 
decision when both sides were not given an opportunity to be heard.141 
The Smith court remanded the case to the Board of Horse Racing for a 
de novo hearing.142 Although the Smith court found a due process 
violation and overturned the stewards’ decision, this is certainly a 
minority decision; in most cases, courts have upheld stewards’ 
decisions as to interference disqualifications. 
Although a significant number of cases in horse racing litigation 
comprise questions concerning horse eligibility, drug testing, 
interference, and riding fouls, other cases have involved issues outside 
these general categories. 
D. Miscellaneous Other Grounds
Several disqualification cases involve unique fact patterns. For 
example, in Texas Racing Commission v. Marquez, two racehorses 
owned by the same owner inadvertently wore each other’s saddlecloth 
numbers.143 This mistake was a violation of Texas Racing Commission 
rules, so the stewards disqualified both horses (one of the horses had 
finished second in the race).144 The Texas Racing Commission refused 
to consider the owner’s appeal.145 The trial court held, however, that 
the Executive Director of the Texas Racing Commission exceeded her 
authority by refusing the appeal and ordered the distribution of the 
second-place purse to the owner.146 
The Texas Court of Appeals in Marquez closely examined the 
statute that governed appeals of stewards’ decisions147 and found that 
such appeals were allowed except in (1) cases that involve a 
“disqualification for a foul in a race” and (2) cases that involve findings 
“of fact regarding the running of a race.”148 The Marquez court 
reasoned that because the statute mentioned that only disqualifications 
for a foul or facts regarding the running of a race are unappealable, it 
followed that other stewards’ decisions are appealable.149 Thus, the 
141 Id. at 754. 
142 Id.  
143 Tex. Racing Comm’n v. Marquez, No. 03-09-00635-CV, 2011 WL 3659092, at *1 
(Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at *5. 
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decision to disqualify the horses for wearing each other’s saddlecloth 
numbers would be appealable. Accordingly, the Marquez court upheld 
the trial court’s finding that the Executive Director of the Texas Racing 
Commission exceeded her authority in denying the appeal. But the 
court also held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to 
decide on the merits of the case until the owner exhausted his 
administrative remedies.150 
Another unique case involved the absolute insurer rule—a rule in 
horse racing that makes horse trainers the absolute insurer of their 
horses, irrespective of the acts of jockeys or any other third parties.151 
In Jackson v. Arkansas Racing Commission, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas upheld the disqualification of Valhol as the first-place horse 
in the 1999 Arkansas Derby. Additionally, the court upheld the 
application of the absolute insurer rule.152 In the Jackson case, 
racetrack officials found a battery—a prohibited device—on the 
racetrack.153 After reviewing video footage of the race, track officials 
found that Valhol’s jockey dropped an object on the track.154 After the 
stewards’ inquiry, Valhol was disqualified, the jockey was suspended 
and fined, and the purse money from the Derby was redistributed.155 
Valhol’s owner appealed the disqualification decision of the 
Arkansas Racing Commission, but the trial court upheld the 
decision.156 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the horse’s 
owner argued that the Arkansas Racing Commission lacked the 
authority to redistribute the purse because no rule explicitly authorized 
that sanction for that violation.157 The Jackson court agreed with the 
finding of the trial court, which remarked that the Arkansas Racing 
Commission “may take what action it deems necessary to supervise, 
regulate, and control, in the public’s interest, horse racing.” The 
Jackson court also opined that “stewards are empowered to punish 
150 Id. at *5–6 (“In this context and given our conclusion that the director exceeded her 
authority by denying [the horse owner] an administrative appeal, we conclude that the trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make further rulings . . . of the stewards’ decision 
until [the horse owner] exhausts his administrative remedies.”). 
151 See, e.g., Luke P. Iovine, III & John E. Keefe, Jr., Horse Drugging – The New Jersey 
Trainer Absolute Insurer Rule: Burning Down the House to Roast the Pig, 1 SETON HALL 
J. SPORT L. 61 (1991) (generally discussing the absolute insurer rule in New Jersey).
152 Jackson v. Ark. Racing Comm’n, 34 S.W.3d 740, 741 (Ark. 2001).
153 Id. (“A battery is a small electrical device that, if used, could alter the outcome of a
race by increasing the horse’s speed.”). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 742. 
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violations of those rules.”158 Thus, the Jackson court found that 
redistribution of the purse was an appropriate sanction.159 
Valhol’s owner also argued that the violation resulted from the 
actions of his jockey and that the Arkansas Racing Commission both 
failed to meet the burden of proof for the sanction and violated the 
owner’s constitutional due process rights by imposing that sanction.160 
The owner contended that, before imposing the sanction, the 
Commission was required to make a factual finding that the violation 
involved complicity between the owner and the jockey.161  
The Jackson court rejected both arguments, upholding the 
application of the absolute insurer rule.162 The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas previously upheld the constitutionality of the absolute insurer 
rule,163 and the Jackson case reaffirmed its applicability to horse racing 
in Arkansas.164 The Jackson court stated as follows:  
Possession of the device violated rule 1214 [the rule prohibiting the 
possession of an electrical device during a race], and no other rule 
required the commission to find that [the horse owner] was aware his 
jockey possessed the device or that the device actually altered the 
race’s outcome. Given the rule’s violation, disqualification 
resulted.165  
Therefore, the Arkansas Racing Commission did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, nor did they violate the owner’s constitutional due 
process rights.166 
Another unusual disqualification occurred in Kaufman v. 
Sarafan.167 In Kaufman, a horse named Blazin’ C was disqualified as 
the 1980 winner of a New York race.168 The disqualification resulted 
158 Id. at 742–43. 
159 Id. at 743. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 744. 
163 D’Avignon v. Ark. Racing Comm’n, 651 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Ark. 1983) (“We feel the 
enterprises of horse and dog racing are especially susceptible to fraud and deceit because of 
the parimutuel wagering. It is apparent that detection of the adulteration of an entrant prior 
to payment to the winning betters is not feasible and it is imperative that society be afforded 
as much protection as possible to prevent abuses. For these reasons, we find the absolute 
insurer (Rule 1233) a constitutional and valid exercise of the police power of this state.”). 
164 Jackson, 34 S.W.3d at 744. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 See Kaufman v. Sarafan, 452 N.E.2d 1252 (N.Y. 1983). 
168 Id. at 1253. 
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from a handicap169 error.170 The Court of Appeals of New York—New 
York’s appellate court of final appeal171—reaffirmed that the horse’s 
owner was responsible for the handicap error, not the race secretary.172 
All these cases illustrate that disqualifications after a horse race are 
not as rare as they may appear at first glance. The 2019 Kentucky Derby 
is an example of this phenomenon but on a much larger scale and with 
much more at stake. 
II 
THE 2019 KENTUCKY DERBY—AN ANALYSIS OF WEST V. KENTUCKY 
HORSE RACING COMMISSION 
Maximum Security’s disqualification from the 2019 Kentucky 
Derby was not the first controversial disqualification in Derby history. 
On May 4, 1968, Dancer’s Image, a horse owned by Peter Fuller, 
crossed the finish line first in the Kentucky Derby.173 However, 
Dancer’s Image was disqualified two days later because he tested 
positive for phenylbutazone,174 an illegal substance in horse racing at 
the time.175 Several theories surround this case, one of which suggests 
that Mr. Fuller was the victim of retaliation; more specifically, either 
Fuller’s horse, the horse’s feed, or the urine sample in question was 
169 See Horse Betting: Graded Stakes and Handicap Races, US RACING, https://www. 
usracing.com/horse-betting/handicapping-stakes-races [https://perma.cc/2NQV-YY9F] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (“With handicap races, preference is given to those horses that 
have been assigned the most weight. The Racing Secretary assigns weights to horses in a 
handicap race, with the horses who have accomplished the most according to their past 
performances carrying the highest weight, while the least competitive horses will carry a 
lower weight. Assigning different weights is an attempt to level the playing field between 
competitors.”). 
170 Kaufman, 452 N.E.2d at 1253. 
171 The Court of Appeals of the State of New York, CORNELL U. L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/court/background.htm [https://perma.cc/MJ2C-XS2D] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (“The Court of Appeals, New York State’s highest court, is 
composed of a Chief Judge and six Associate Judges, each appointed to a 14-year term.”). 
172 Kaufman, 452 N.E.2d at 1253. 
173 T.D. Thornton, Revisiting Dancer’s Image, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2008, 10:35 AM), 
https://therail.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/03/revisiting-dancers-image/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CMZ3-EPWA]. 
174 Sid Gustafson, Drugs and Racehorses, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2008, 3:42 PM), https:// 
therail.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/drugs-and-racehorses/ [https://perma.cc/7P3G-8HM6] 
(“Phenylbutazone, or bute, abbreviated from the early popular brand Butazolodin, is a 
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug very similar to aspirin.”). 
175 Thornton, supra note 173. 
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intentionally tampered with because Fuller had supported civil 
rights.176  
Mr. Fuller litigated the dispute and the Kentucky State Racing 
Commission upheld Dancer’s Image’s disqualification.177 The trial 
court then reversed the Commission, finding for Mr. Fuller.178 On 
appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Kentucky 
State Racing Commission met the “substantial evidence” standard 
when it upheld Dancer’s Image’s disqualification.179 The Fuller court 
remarked that the substantial evidence standard “is whether when taken 
alone or in the light of all the evidence it has sufficient probative value 
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”180 The court 
analyzed the expert testimony and the record, then held that “there was 
an abundance of substantial evidence supporting the findings and 
rulings of the Kentucky State Racing Commission.”181 Thus, Mr. 
Fuller and Dancer’s Image lost. 
Approximately fifty-one years later, controversy again surrounded 
the Kentucky Derby when Maximum Security was disqualified for 
interference. Just like Mr. Fuller, Gary and Mary West have filed suit 
in the wake of Maximum Security’s disqualification.182 
The crux of the Wests’ Complaint is that the stewards lacked 
substantial evidence to disqualify Maximum Security and that the 
disqualification violated the Wests’ Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process.183 The Wests allege that after the stewards read the 
disqualification statement  
the Stewards refused to answer any questions that might theoretically 
shed light on the evidence on which they relied, the reasoning behind 
their disqualification, how their decision to disqualify satisfied the 
rules governing fouls, and the deliberative process by which they 
unanimously came to the conclusion to disqualify Maximum 
Security.184  
176 Id. 
177 Ky. State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 308. 
181 Id. at 309. 
182 Darran Simon, Owners of Kentucky Derby Horse Maximum Security File 
Lawsuit Seeking to Overturn the Disqualification, CNN (May 15, 2019, 11:27 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/us/maximum-security-kentucky-derby-lawsuit/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/HBS4-6HJG]. 
183 West Complaint, supra note 16. 
184 Id. ¶ 96. 
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The Wests claim that the stewards disqualified Maximum Security 
before they interviewed the two horse jockeys allegedly involved in the 
interference. The Wests also allege that the stewards failed to establish 
not only that the interference had occurred but also that the interference 
affected the race’s finish.185  
In their brief in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Wests rely186 on the Louisiana Court of Appeals’ decision in Ramsey 
v. Louisiana State Racing Commission.187 In Ramsey, a horse named
Coalport fouled Benwill during the Unbridled Stakes horse race on
September 6, 2014.188 Coalport won the race, but the stewards
disqualified him.189 Coalport’s owner conceded that Coalport
committed a foul, but the question remained whether the foul altered
the race’s outcome.190 In Ramsey, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held
that even though a foul occurred, “the foul ‘did not alter the outcome
of the race,’” and that the Louisiana State Racing Commission applied
the wrong standard of review in analyzing the stewards’
disqualification.191 The Ramsey court noted that the Louisiana State
Racing Commission committed legal error when it used an
“indisputable evidence” standard instead of a “preponderance of the
evidence” standard; thus, the courts gave no deference to the Louisiana
State Racing Commission’s determinations.192
Given the claims in the West case, the Kentucky State Horse Racing 
Commission will likely prevail, and the stewards’ decision to 
disqualify Maximum Security should stand. As to the claim that the 
stewards’ decision was arbitrary or capricious, a number of facts 
strongly weigh against any such finding. First, although the stewards 
did not discuss the incident with every jockey potentially affected by 
the interference, they did interview Luis Saez—the jockey of 
Maximum Security193—and gave Saez the opportunity to present his 
version of the facts. Second, the stewards deliberated for approximately 
185 Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, West v. Ky. Horse 
Racing Comm’n, No. 5:19-cv-00211-KKC (E.D. Ky. May 31, 2019) [hereinafter West’s 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
186 Id. at 16–19. 
187 Ramsey v. La. State Racing Comm’n, 248 So. 3d 648 (La. Ct. App. 2018). 
188 Id. at 650. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 652–53. 
192 Id. at 653. 
193 See West’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 185, at 7. 
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twenty-two minutes, which indicates the stewards at least conducted a 
reasonable investigation into the incident.194  
Those investigations are specifically left to the discretion of the 
stewards. Kentucky administrative regulations explicitly endow the 
stewards with the following powers:  
• To “[m]ake all findings of fact as to all matters occurring during
and incident to the running of a race”;195
• To “[d]etermine all objections and inquiries based on
interference by a horse, improper course run by a horse, foul
riding by a jockey, and all other matters occurring during and
incident to the running of a race”;196 and
• To “[d]etermine the extent of disqualification, if any, of horses
in a race for a foul committed during the race.”197
The regulations also specifically state that the stewards’ “findings of 
fact and determination shall be final and shall not be subject to 
appeal.”198 These regulations presumably reflect the view that the 
stewards—not outside parties, such as judicial courts—are the experts 
best suited to make the intricate factual determinations as to whether 
interference or fouls have occurred.  
As a baseball fan, I may love the game of baseball, and I may agree 
or disagree with an umpire’s call when watching my beloved Kansas 
City Royals play baseball. But that would hardly qualify me to act as a 
major league baseball umpire, calling balls, strikes, and outs. And if the 
courts became involved with the balls and strikes of America’s pastime, 
the unique experience and particular expertise of baseball umpires may 
be disregarded.199 Similarly, in horse racing, if the courts routinely 
reviewed the intricate factual determinations of stewards, then every 
owner of a horse that did not finish first in a race would be incentivized 
to search for an interference or foul that actually does not exist. As a 
public policy matter, courts should not insert their judgment into 
controversial finishes in horse racing or any other sport because it will 
leave the fans with uncertainty at the conclusion of a sporting event. 
194 Id. at 6. 
195 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:017 § 4(a) (2019) (repealed). 
196 Id. § 4(b). 
197 Id. § 4(c). 
198 Id. § 4(c)(2). 
199 See Jim Caple, Humbled by Umpire School, ESPN (Feb. 26, 2011), https://www. 
espn.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=caple_jim&id=6161420 [https://perma.cc/6Q7B-
V2PE]. 
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Judicial interference also detracts from the sports controversies fans 
and commentators discuss and debate from generation to generation. 
The Kentucky Horse Racing Commission has focused on the 
argument that the Wests did not have a cognizable Fourteenth 
Amendment property interest in the first-place prize before the 
stewards posted the official order of finish.200 In March v. Kentucky 
Horse Racing Commission201—a case cited by the Kentucky Horse 
Racing Commission202—the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the 
owner of Ethical Lawyer, a horse disqualified from a race on February 
24, 2012, did not have a property interest in the purse because the horse 
was not awarded first place.203 As the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 
March noted, the horse owner’s interest was at best a privilege and not 
a property interest protected by due process.204 The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky will likely follow 
the lead of March in the West litigation, as the situations are similar—
Maximum Security was never declared the official winner of the 
Kentucky Derby; thus, no property interest was created.  
Further insights may be gleaned by comparing the Wests’ alleged 
property interest in the Derby’s outcome with cases resolving the 
question as to whether students have a protected property interest in 
their participation on school sports teams. Courts throughout the 
country routinely answer that there is no constitutionally protected 
property interest in participating in competitive sports.205  
One of the more salient arguments for the Kentucky Horse Racing 
Commission is that, by participating in the Kentucky Derby, the owners 
of Maximum Security consented to the rules and regulations of the 
200 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8–12, West v. 
Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, No. 5:19-cv-00211-KKC (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2019) [hereinafter 
Kentucky Horse Racing Commission’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss]. 
201 March v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, No. 2013-CA-000900-MR, 2015 WL 3429763 
(Ky. Ct. App. May 29, 2015). 
202 Kentucky Horse Racing Commission’s Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 200, at 10–12. 
203 March, 2015 WL 3429763 at *2. 
204 Id. at *3. 
205 See, e.g., Mitchell v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 430 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 
1970) (“The privilege of participating in interscholastic athletics must be deemed to fall in 
the latter category and outside the protection of due process.”); Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic 
Fed’n, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Participation in interscholastic 
athletics, standing alone, is but one stick in the bundle of the educational process and does 
not rise to the level of a separate property or liberty interest to which a student is entitled 
and of which he or she cannot be deprived without due process.”). 
2020] Disqualifications in Horse Racing 573
Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, which state that horse racing is 
a privilege and not a right.206 As noted above, the applicable rules and 
regulations vest the stewards with the authority to make factual 
determinations as to interference and fouls. No right to an appeal is 
provided in those rules—a fact that presumably was known by all 
owners and trainers who had participating horses. In addition to the 
argument that horse racing in the state of Kentucky is not a right, it 
should also be noted that the participants in the Kentucky Derby have 
a duty to follow the rules of the race. Just as an insured person generally 
has a duty to read the insurance contracts they enter,207 the participants 
of the Kentucky Derby have an affirmative duty to avoid interference 
or a foul during a race. And if interference or a foul occurs, then the 
stewards have the general authority to make factual determinations. All 
the participants in the race arguably consented to this rule. 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for upholding the official results 
of the 2019 Kentucky Derby is to serve the policy of promoting the 
finality of official outcomes. Protracted litigation concerning a 
judgment call at a sporting event detracts from the certainty sports fans 
have come to expect once an official winner is announced. It also 
detracts from the rich history of controversial decisions in other 
sports—from calls in baseball, such as the famous Don Denkinger call 
in Game Six of the 1985 World Series between the St. Louis Cardinals 
and Kansas City Royals,208 to calls in football, such as the famous 
“tuck rule” call in the 2002 AFC playoff game between the Oakland 
Raiders and New England Patriots.209As the Illinois Court of Appeals 
aptly remarked in the Kline case, “The essence of horse racing is the 
immediate finality of declaring the winner.”210 For these reasons, 
courts will likely uphold the stewards’ decision as to the official 
outcome of the 2019 Kentucky Derby. 
206 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215(1) (West 2019) (“Further, it is hereby declared the 
policy and intent of the Commonwealth that the conduct of horse racing, or the participation 
in any way in horse racing, or the entrance to or presence where horse racing is conducted, 
is a privilege and not a personal right; and that this privilege may be granted or denied by 
the racing commission or its duly approved representatives acting in its behalf.”). 
207 See Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ransdell, 82 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1935). 
208 Doug Miller, Denkinger Cool with Reminders of Mistaken Call in ‘85 Series, 
MLB.COM (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.mlb.com/news/don-denkinger-players-recall-
blown-call-in-1985-world-series/c-99040244 [https://perma.cc/KA3G-FDCA]. 
209 Karen Given, The ‘Tuck Rule’ Game That Started a Dynasty . . . and a Backlash, 
WBUR (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/onlyagame/2017/02/03/patriots-tuck-rule 
[https://perma.cc/6MVQ-M6ZG]. 
210 Kline v. Ill. Racing Bd., 469 N.E.2d 667, 672 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
The 2019 Triple Crown horse racing season has been nothing short 
of memorable and replete with oddities and rare events. Following the 
controversial outcome of the 2019 Kentucky Derby on May 18, 2019, 
viewers of the Preakness Stakes at Pimlico in Maryland saw an unusual 
event. Bodexpress, one of the horses competing in the race, threw off 
Hall of Fame jockey John Velaquez in the opening seconds of the 
race.211 Undeterred by the lack of a jockey, Bodexpress ran the entire 
length of the course without a jockey, and at several points legitimately 
vied for first place.212 Reporters wrote numerous articles about 
Bodexpress’s determination to compete.213 The ending of the 2019 
Kentucky Derby and the heroic run of Bodexpress illustrate that there 
is a fair amount of uncertainty in a horse race, and that what may appear 
to be strange events in horse racing may not be so strange after all. 
This Article demonstrates that disqualification decisions in horse 
races are generally not as rare as is implied by the narrative surrounding 
the stewards’ decision in the 2019 Kentucky Derby. Overall, courts 
have been reluctant to overturn stewards’ decisions—even on due 
process grounds—which means a change in the outcome of the 2019 
Kentucky Derby is very unlikely. 
As the 2019 Kentucky Derby and 2019 Preakness Stakes 
demonstrate, “[a]nything can happen in horse racing.”214 A racetrack 
may be muddy, a horse may be ill or not feel well on a particular day, 
or a horse may be extremely agitated at the gate—all these 
circumstances can affect the outcome of a race. It is this range of 
possibilities that makes horse racing a fascinating sport. No outcome is 
211 ESPN News Services, Bodexpress Runs Entire Preakness Without Jockey, ESPN 
(May 18, 2019), https://www.espn.com/horse-racing/story/_/id/26776938/bodexpress-runs-
entire-preakness-jockey [https://perma.cc/A4QN-U4RW]. 
212 Id. 
213 See, e.g., Zach Brook, The Real Winner of the Preakness Was Bodexpress, the 
Jockey-less Horse, NBC SPORTS (May 18, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.nbcsports.com/ 
washington/other-sports/real-winner-preakness-was-bodexpress-jockey-less-horse [https:// 
perma.cc/88QR-XFFE]; David Ginsburg, Jockeyless Horse Steals the Show at the 
Preakness, BOS. GLOBE (May 18, 2019), https://www.boston.com/sports/sports-news/2019/ 
05/18/jockeyless-horse-steals-the-show-at-the-preakness [https://perma.cc/N5UD-LGCU]; 
Hemal Jhaveri, The Real Winner of the 2019 Preakness Is the Horse That Ran Without a 
Jockey, USA TODAY (May 18, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2019/05/ 
preakness-bodexpress-ran-without-a-jockey [https://perma.cc/99CQ-M4QY]. 
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absolutely certain. And sometimes, even a long-shot horse—the “dark 
horse”215—will unexpectedly end up the winner.216 
215 The term “dark horse” has been used in politics to describe a long-shot candidate. 
Generally, a “dark horse” is a long shot. See, e.g., William G. Ross, Presidential Ambitions 
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: A History and an Ethical Warning, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 115, 
167 (2011) (“Long gone is the era in which conventions would nominate ‘dark horse’ 
candidates or draft a nominee who had not sought the nomination.”). 
216 See David Hayes, Country House Wins 2019 Kentucky Derby as Shocking Dark 
Horse Amid Disqualification Controversy, FANDUEL (May 4, 2019), https://www.fanduel. 
com/theduel/posts/country-house-wins-2019-kentucky-derby-as-shocking-dark-horse-
amid-disqualification-controversy-01da2e1zknyq [https://perma.cc/HD8G-PQAW]. 
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